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The fascination of what’s difficult
Has dried the sap out of my veins, and rent
Spontaneous joy and natural content
Out of my heart. There’s something ails our colt
That must, as if it had not holy blood
Nor on Olympus leaped from cloud to cloud,
Shiver under the lash, strain, sweat and jolt
As though it dragged road-metal. My curse on plays
That have to be set up in fifty ways,
On the day’s war with every knave and dolt,
Theatre business, management of men.
I swear before the dawn comes round again
I’ll find the stable and pull out the bolt. 1
—W.B. Yeats
I. INT RODUCT ION
The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act of 2011 (AIA) 2 introduced the most
significant changes to the United States patent system in more than fifty years. 3
To some, the AIA has been an efficient means to cancel dubious patents. 4 To
others, it is a system that too easily revokes granted patent rights. 5 All can agree,
however, that the AIA has created a host of novel legal issues for the Federal
Circuit and the United States Supreme Court.

1. W ILLIAM BUTLER YEATS, The Fascination of What’s Difficult, in T HE COLLECTED
P OEMS OF W.B. YEATS 88 (Richard J. Finneran, ed., 1989). In an outline of this poem, Yeats wrote
in his diary, “ Subject: T o complain at the fascination of what ’s difficult. It spoils spontaneity and
pleasure, and wastes time.” A. NORMAN JEFFARES, A COMMENTARY ON THE COLLECTED P OEMS
OF W.B. YEATS 106 (1968).
2. America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (codified in scattered sections of
35 U.S.C. (2012)).
3. See, e.g., P. Andrew Riley, Jonathan R.K. Stroud & Jeffrey T otten, The Surprising
Breadth of Post-Grant Review for Covered-Business-Method Patents: A New Way to Challenge
Patent Claims, 15 COLUM. SCI. & T ECH . L. REV. 235, 241 (2014); Paul Michel & Matthew J.
Dowd, The Uncertain State of Patent Law 10 Years into The Roberts Court, I NTELLECTUAL ASSET
MANAGEMENT, Nov./Dec. 2016, at 27.
4. Riley et al., supra note 3, at 240.
5. See Michel & Dowd, supra note 3, at 33.
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One such issue concerns standing under Article III of the United States
Constitution. Standing is one of the most fundamental prerequisites for litigants
in federal courts. 6 It constitutionally ensures that federal courts hear only
“cases” or “controversies” and avoid advisory opinions or political questions. 7
The AIA authorizes anyone, 8 except the patent owner, to seek cancellation of
patent claims through its post-grant proceedings. 9 But an administrative
petitioner seeking to cancel a patent before the United States Patent and
Trademark Office (PTO) may not be able to establish independent Article III
standing. While Article III standing is not required to participate in agency
proceedings such as AIA reviews, it does limit who can participate in the review
of the agency’s final decision at the district or appellate level. 10 That disconnect
has led to uncertainty over whether all petitioners can seek judicial review of
Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) final decisions.
Until recently, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit had
rarely ruled directly on appellate standing for administrative appeals. 11 The
Federal Circuit had, of course, ruled on standing related to district court patent
litigation, 12 but only recently did it directly address Article III standing in

6. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984) (“ All of the doctrines that cluster about
Article III—not only standing but mootness, ripeness, political question, and the like—relate in
part, and in different though overlapping ways, to an idea, which is more than an intuition but less
than a rigorous and explicit theory, about the constitutional and prudential limits to the powers of
an unelected, unrepresentative judiciary in our kind of government.”) (quotation omitted).
7. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. See Massachusetts v. E.P.A., 549 U.S. 497, 516 (2007)
(“ Article III of the Constitution limits federal-court jurisdiction to ‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies.’”).
8. T he Supreme Court recently granted a petition for certiorari in Return Mail, Inc. v. United
States Postal Service, No. 17-1594, slip op. at 1 (U.S. Oct. 26, 2018), directed to the following
question: “ Whether the government is a “ person” who may petition to institute review proceedings
under the AIA.”
T he appeal below referred to section 18(a)(1)(B) of the transitional covered business
method proceeding set to sunset in 2020, which reads: “ A person may not file a petition for a
transitional proceeding with respect to a covered business method patent unless the person or the
person’s real party in interest or privy has been sued for infringement of the patent or has been
charged with infringement under that patent.” Leahy Smith America Invents Act of 2011, Pub. L.
No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 329 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C. § 321).
However, as the AIA’s governing statute for inter partes review (IPR) also includes the
“ person” language, the case will likely determine whether government agencies or organizations
may petition for patent review.
9. 35 U.S.C. § 321(a) (2012).
10. See Jasmine Networks, Inc. v. Super. Ct. of Santa Clara Cty., 103 Cal. Rptr. 3d 426, 432–
33 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009).
11. See Syntex (USA) Inc. v. U.S. Patent & T rademark Office, 882 F.2d 1570, 1575 –76 (Fed.
Cir. 1989) (discussing earlier cases on the issue); see also Boeing Co. v. Comm’r of Patents &
T rademarks, 853 F.2d 878, 881–82 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
12. See, e.g., Prasco LLC v. Medicis Pharm. Corp., 537 F.3d 1329, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
(demonstrating standing in a Declaratory Judgment Act case).
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appeals. 13 These cases, while establishing some guidance, leave significant
appellate standing questions unanswered.
With a limited body of patent-related standing cases from which to draw, the
Federal Circuit runs the risk of fashioning an overly narrow, patent-specific
standing jurisprudence if it does not consider the broader law addressing
standing in appeals from all agency actions. Even the Federal Circuit’s pre-AIA
standing jurisprudence has been criticized as too restrictive. 14 The AIA’s
statutory purpose of a broad review of patents arguably broadened standing to
the constitutional maximum when it authorized judicial review by any party
“dissatisfied with the final written decision.”15
We fill a gap in the literature concerning Article III standing to challenge
patents under the AIA regime. 16 First, we provide a background of standing
requirements under Article III, with emphasis on appeals from federal agency
litigation. A substantial body of non-patent-related case law already addresses
the question of standing on direct appeal from an agency decision; we draw on
those examples. 17
Next, we turn to the issue of standing of appellants, appellees, intervenors,
and amici. Standing considerations differ, depending on the status of the entity.
Under current Federal Circuit law, an appellant, as the party invoking the court’s
jurisdiction, must demonstrate Article III standing; an appellee need not have
independent standing. 18 The Federal Circuit has but once addressed intervenor
standing in AIA appeals. 19 The Supreme Court’s recently explicated rule is that
13. See Consumer Watchdog v. Wis. Alumni Research Found., 753 F.3d 1258, 1260 –61 (Fed.
Cir. 2014); see also PPG Indus. v. Valspar Sourcing, Inc., 679 Fed. App’x 1002, 1004 (Fed. Cir.
2017).
14. Michael J. Burstein, Rethinking Standing in Patent Challenges, 83 GEO . W ASH . L. REV.
498, 500 (2015) (contending that “the Federal Circuit has misconceived the injury that arises from
even the mere existence of a patent, has crafted patent -specific standing rules that are more
restrictive than those called for under the Supreme Court ’s broader standing precedents, and has
created a misalignment between those who have the incentive to challenge patents and those who
have standing to do so”); John F. Duffy, Standing to Challenge Patents, Enforcement Risk, and
Separation of Powers, 83 GEO . W ASH . L. REV. 628, 643 (2015) (“ [E]ven within the Federal
Circuit’s own jurisprudence, there’s a glaring inconsistency in how the court measures standing to
challenge governmental grants of patent rights versus how it measures standing to challenge other
governmental grants to competitors.”).
15. 35 U.S.C. §§ 319, 329 (2012).
16. For other useful scholarship on appellate standing, see generally Amy J. Wildermuth &
Lincoln L. Davies, Standing, On Appeal, 2010 U. I LL . L. REV. 957 (2010); Joan E. Steinman,
Irregulars: The Appellate Rights of Persons Who Are Not Full-Fledged Parties, 39 GA . L. REV.
411, 414–15 (2005); Joan E. Steinman, Shining a Light in a Dim Corner: Standing to Appeal and
the Right to Defend a Judgment in the Federal Courts, 38 GA . L. REV. 813, 816–17 (2004)
[hereinafter Steinman, Shining a Light].
17. A majority of that case law has been developed by the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit, given its jurisdiction over direct appeals from several federal
agencies.
18. See Pers. Audio, LLC v. Elec. Frontier Found., 867 F.3d 1246, 1250 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
19. Knowles Elecs. LLC v. Iancu, 886 F.3d 1369, 1372 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
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an intervenor must have standing when it seeks relief not identical to the relief
sought by the plaintiff, though the Federal Circuit may have sidestepped that by
indicating the Director has independent standing to intervene. 20 An amicus, of
course, need not have standing, filing generally at the permission of the court
and parties. 21 Additionally, we note that the Supreme Court has recently asked
for the Solicitor General’s views on the issue of appellate standing in RPX v.
Chanbond petition for certiorari, which suggests the high court may soon weigh
in. 22
We conclude by exploring various procedural and strategic issues associated
with standing in appeals from the PTAB. The Federal Circuit is breaking new
ground, having to make fact-based standing determinations for the first time on
appeal. This creates an awkward responsibility for the court—particularly
related to sensitive evidence and evidentiary scope—but there are options,
including looking to the D.C. Circuit’s longstanding procedures for guidance.
For the parties involved, there are strategic considerations—what evidence to
marshal and when, which arguments to advance, and the timing of when
standing should be addressed.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Constitutional Justiciability Doctrine
The Constitution limits the power of federal courts, controlling which disputes
they may entertain. Pursuant to Article III, the federal courts may only
adjudicate certain “cases” or “controversies.” 23 The Supreme Court and other
federal courts have elucidated several doctrines establishing Article III limits
federal court jurisdiction to disputes that seek to “redress or prevent actual or
imminently threatened injury to persons caused by private or official violation
of law.”24 The doctrines of standing, ripeness, and mootness (along with the
redressability, advisory opinion, and political question doctrines), collectively
distinguish the justiciable from the nonjusticiable—defining the scope of the
authority for Article III courts. 25

20. T own of Chester v. Laroe Estates, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1645, 1648 (2017); see Knowles, 886
F.3d at 1372 n.2 (“ T he Director of the USPT O, thus, has standing.”).
21. See, e.g., NGV Gaming, Ltd. v. Upstream Point Molate, LLC, 355 F. Supp. 2d 1061,
1063, 1068 (N.D. Cal. 2005); Rio Grande Pipeline Co. v. FERC, 178 F.3d 533, 539 (D.C. Cir.
1999).
22. RPX Corporation v. Chanbond LLC, No. 17-1686, slip op. at 1 (U.S. Oct. 1, 2018) (“The
Solicitor General is invited to file briefs in these cases expressing the views of the United States. ”).
23. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
24. Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 492 (2009).
25. JARED P. COLE , CONG . RESEARCH SERV., An Introduction to Judicial Review of Federal
Agency Action 6 n.58 (Dec. 7, 2016) (citing Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984)); see
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2661 (2013) (discussing standing).
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The doctrines of justiciability all largely spring from the Court’s early opinion
in Marbury v. Madison, 26 and reflect a deep-seeded desire written into our
Constitution to maintain checks and balances between the three branches of
Federal Government.
“Standing,” as understood by most courts, is a judicial notion “rooted in the
constitutionally limited subject matter jurisdiction of [federal] courts.” 27 It is
most commonly applied to a party’s right to sue in a federal district court, but
can also apply to a party’s right to “stand” before an appeals court. Standing to
sue was hinted at in Fairchild v. Hughes, 28 a case concerning woman’s suffrage
that held a general citizen lacked the ability to challenge his state’s ratification
of the 19th Amendment, which the court deemed a political question. 29 As the
doctrine matured, courts grew adept at placing standing requirements within
constitutional doctrine, most commonly citing the requirements of the Tenth
Amendment and the separation of powers. 30 This is, in part, because Federal
courts are not supposed to act as “superlegislature[s]” that make broad policybased decisions. 31 Instead, the Framers created federal tribunals to resolve realworld disputes, with clearly defined questions of law based on facts. 32 In other
words, “the judicial power may not be harnessed into a monitoring role over
federal agencies that should be conducted by Congress.”33
To demonstrate the “irreducible constitutional minimum of standing,”
plaintiffs must meet three requirements. 34 First, the plaintiff must demonstrate
an “injury in fact” that is both concrete and particularized—that is, an actual or
imminent injury, rather than merely conjectural or hypothetical. 35 Second, the

26. 5 U.S. 137 (1803). (“ The Constitution vests the whole judicial power of the United States
in one Supreme Court, and such inferior courts as Congress shall, from time to time, ordain and
establish. T his power is expressly extended to all cases arising under the laws of the United States;
and consequently, in some form, may be exercised over the present case; because the right claimed
is given by a law of the United States.”). Perhaps the leading scholar on justiciability, Dean Edwin
Chemerinsky, divides it into four distinct doctrines: standing, ripeness, mootness, and political
question. He notes t hat the first three are constitutional while the fourth is prudential, though courts
routinely overlap or confuse the doctrines. See Edwin Chemerinsky, A Unified Approach to
Justiciability, 22 CONN . L. REV. 677, 677–78, 683 (1990) (discussing the four doctrines, noting
substantial overlap, and advocating for a unified approach to all such questions).
27. Jasmine Networks Inc. v. Super. Ct. of Santa Clara Cty., 103 Cal. Rptr. 3d 426, 432 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2009).
28. 258 U.S. 126 (1922).
29. Id. at 129–30.
30. See Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2086 (2014); see also Steinman, Shining a
Light, supra, note 16, at 829.
31. New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976).
32. Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 492 (2009).
33. COLE , supra note 25, at 6 (citing Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 760 (1984)).
34. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
35. Id.
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injury must be fairly traceable to the challenged action. 36 Third, the injury must
be redressable by a favorable judicial decision. 37
Even when the three elements are met, principles of prudence may counsel
against a court adjudicating some legal claims. 38 This is known as “prudential
standing.”39 The doctrine of prudential standing generally consists of three
equitable bars: “[1] the general prohibition on a litigant’s raising another
person’s legal rights, [2] the rule barring adjudication of generalized grievances
more appropriately addressed in the representative branches, and [3] the
requirement that a plaintiff’s complaint fall within the zone of interests protected
by the law invoked.”40 An individual court may ignore or overcome such
considerations as vested to its discretion. Similarly, Congress may, by statute,
obviate any prudential standing concerns by “grant[ing] an express right of
action to persons who otherwise would be barred by prudential standing rules.”41
Prudential limits on standing are “essentially matters of judicial selfgovernance.”42 Further, “[r]ules of prudential standing, by contrast, are more
flexible ‘rule[s] . . . of federal appellate practice.’” 43 They shield courts from
“decid[ing] abstract questions of wide public significance even though other
governmental institutions may be more competent to address the questions and
even though judicial intervention may be unnecessary to protect individual
rights.”44
To be sure, “Congress may enact statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of
which creates standing, even though no injury would exist without the statute.” 45
But just how far Congress may go to spark such standing is unclear. In Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, the Supreme Court distinguished Congress’s ability to
expand categories of standing, which may in effect lower certain litigants’
burden regarding redressability and immediacy if a procedural right is triggered,

36. Id.
37. Id. at 561.
38. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 11 (2004).
39. Id. at 12.
40. Id. (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984)).
41. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975).
42. Id. at 500.
43. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2686 (2013) (quoting Deposit Guar. Nat’l
Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 333 (1980)).
44. Warth, 422 U.S. at 500; see S. T odd Brown, The Story of Prudential Standing, 42
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 95, 96 (2014) (“ T echnically speaking, prudential standing is not really
‘standing’ at all; it is merely a judicially crafted set of exceptions to the obligation to hear and
decide matters that are within the court ’s jurisdiction.”).
45. Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 618 n.3 (1973); Warth, 422 U.S. at 514
(“ Congress may create a statutory right or entitlement[,] the alleged deprivation of which can confer
standing to sue even where the plaintiff would have suffered no judicially cognizable injury in the
absence of statute.”); Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 578 (1992).
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from the overarching constitutional standing requirements. 46 As expressed in
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence, “Congress has the power to define injuries and
articulate chains of causation that will give rise to a case or controversy where
none existed before.”47
B. Article III and Administrative Standing on Appeal
Article III standing is not required for proceedings before administrative
agencies such as the PTO. 48 Instead, “the starting point for a standing
determination for a litigant before an administrative agency . . . is the statute that
confers standing before that agency.”49 Courts reviewing cases appealed from
federal agencies have made this clear. 50 Thus, Congress can grant—and
seemingly has granted—standing for virtually anyone to participate in some
types of federal agency proceedings. 51
But constitutional requirements for standing apply just as they do to in the
district court. 52 The Supreme Court has carried over into appeals much of the
same constitutional weight for standing required by the initial threshold for
standing to sue in the district court. 53 Both standing to sue and standing to appeal
require the same three elements: injury in fact, causation, and redressability. 54
For this reason, courts enforce the standing requirement when a party appeals
from an administrative agency to an Article III court. 55 For instance, the D.C.
Circuit frequently addresses standing first on appeal because that court has
jurisdiction over direct appellate review of several agency decisions, for which

46. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573 n.7 (noting “ [t]he person who has been accorded a procedural right
to protect his concrete interests can assert that right without meeting all the normal standards for
redressability and immediacy”). Nonetheless, the Lujan Court held that the alleged injury of failure
to be consulted regarding overseas funding for endangered wildlife was not sufficient to confer
standing. Id.
47. Id. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
48. Consumer Watchdog v. Wis. Alumni Research Found., 753 F.3d 1258, 1261 (Fed. Cir.
2014).
49. See Ritchie v. Simpson, 170 F.3d 1092, 1095 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
50. See, e.g., Cal. Ass’n of Physically Handicapped, Inc. v. FCC, 778 F.2d 823, 826 n.8 (D.C.
Cir. 1985) (“ T he Article III restrictions under which this court operates do not, of course, apply to
the FCC. T he Commission may choose to allow persons without Article III ‘standing’ to participate
in FCC proceedings.”).
51. Wildermuth & Davies, supra note 16, at 966 (explaining that the language in the relevant
agency’s statutory grant of authority is the determinant).
52. See Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2661 (2013) (explaining that “ Article III
demands that an ‘actual controversy’ persist throughout all stages of litigation”).
53. See id. at 2661, 2668.
54. See id. at 2661. T his is true even though, arguably, the same constitutional doctrines that
would apply to standing to sue do not logically apply to standing to appeal. For example, the same
issue of separation of powers would not logically exist of a higher court reviewing the decision of
a lower court. See Steinman, Shining a Light, supra, note 16, at 839–47.
55. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. EPA, 292 F.3d 895, 898 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
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standing need not be demonstrated below. 56 Other appellate courts do as well. 57
Although the Supreme Court has noted standing remains a constitutional
question on appeal, one commentator notes that, “some pronouncements in
Supreme Court opinions cloud which aspects of standing to appeal are of
constitutional magnitude and which have been imposed by the Court in the
interest of prudent judicial administration.”58 The Circuit courts wrestle with
those distinctions. As discussed below, the Federal Circuit recently held as a
matter of first impression that a party appealing a PTAB decision—or any
administrative decision from the PTO—must demonstrate Article III standing. 59
In contrast, the Supreme Court has suggested—and the Federal Circuit has
followed—that a non-moving party need not prove standing on appeal. 60
For example, in ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 61 the Supreme Court held that even
though the plaintiff-respondents lacked independent Article III standing and thus
could not have filed an action in federal court, the Court nonetheless had
jurisdiction over the appeal, as the petitioners had suffered “a specific injury
stemming from the [adverse] state-court decree.”62 The Court did not question
the participation of the plaintiff-respondents in the appeal. To the contrary, the
Court recognized that “[t]hese parties remain adverse” because the plaintiffrespondents were defending the state court’s judgment, and that the appeal
would resolve a “genuine case or controversy.”63
No court has definitively held that Article III standing applies independently
to appellees where appellants have standing; rather, most courts suggest that if
the party invoking the court’s jurisdiction establishes Article III standing, then
the inquiry is resolved. 64 To be sure, some circuit cases, as discussed below,
suggest that all parties to an appeal might need to demonstrate independent
56. See id. at 899.
57. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. EPA, 781 F.3d 299, 305–306 (6th Cir. 2015); N. Laramie Range
Alliance v. FERC, 733 F.3d 1030, 1034 (10th Cir. 2013); Iowa League of Cities v. EPA, 711 F.3d
844, 869–70 (8th Cir. 2013); Citizens Against Ruining T he Env ’t v. EPA, 535 F.3d 670, 675 (7th
Cir. 2008).
58. See Steinman, Shining a Light, supra, note 16, at 840–41.
59. Consumer Watchdog v. Wis. Alumni Research Found., 753 F.3d 1258, 1260 –61 (Fed.
Cir. 2014).
60. ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 618 (1989).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 617–18. Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens joined this
conclusion as well. Id. at 633.
63. Id. at 619 (quoting T ileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44, 46 (1943)).
64. See, e.g., Bond v. Utreras, 585 F.3d 1061, 1070 (7th Cir. 2009) (holding that an
intervenor’s standing was irrelevant when another plaintiff already satisfied the standing
requirement); Legault v. Zambarano, 105 F.3d 24, 26 (1st Cir. 1997) (dismissing the challenge to
appellee’s standing as a “ meaningless quibble”). Certainly, there is no constitutional requirement
that an entity or individual have redundant Article III standing to participate in a proceeding and
defend a judgment, as evidenced by courts’ frequent practice of appointing attorneys as amicus
curiae to defend lower-court judgments. See e.g., Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257, 1263
(2016).

670

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 67:605

Article III standing. But the dominant view reflects that an appellee is almost
invariably in the best position to provide “that concrete adverseness which
sharpens the presentation of issues.”65
Take Camreta v. Greene, 66 in which the Supreme Court found that an
opposing party “must have an ongoing interest in the dispute, so that the case
features ‘that concrete adverseness[,] which sharpens the presentation of
issues.’”67 Later courts have suggested this supports the idea that each party
must prove independent Article III standing, even on appeal. It does not.
Camreta does not describe constitutional Article III standing, but rather,
prudential standing, which can be relaxed by statute. 68
Notwithstanding that finer point, standing is a highly factual determination
that is difficult to predict, so much so that the Supreme Court has commented
that “[g]eneralizations about standing to sue are largely worthless as such.” 69
Thus, guidance about standing has limited practical value outside the confines
of a particular case.
C. Associational Standing
Trade, business, and advocacy associations are common parties to PTO and
other administrative proceedings, and present specific standing issues.
Associations, like corporations, can demonstrate standing based on the identity
and interests of their members. 70 Associational standing is established by the
following test: “[1] its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their
own right, [2] the interests at stake are germane to the organization’s purpose,
and [3] neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the
participation of individual members in the lawsuit.”71
The Federal Circuit has not yet addressed the issue of associational standing
in a PTAB case, 72 and while a fulsome discussion of associational standing is
outside the scope of this Article, such disputes could be another source of future
analysis. Many industry and professional associations are frequent filers, as was
the case in Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. United States Patent and

65. Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101 (1983) (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204
(1962)).
66. 563 U.S. 692 (2011).
67. Id. at 701 (quoting Lyons, 461 U.S. at 101).
68. Consumer Watchdog v. Wis. Alumni Research Found., 753 F.3d 1258, 1261 (Fed. Cir.
2014); see also United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2685 –86 (2013) (recognizing this
requirement’s prudential nature).
69. Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 151 (1970).
70. Int’l Union v. Brock, 477 U.S. 274, 282 (1986) (citing Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert.
Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977)).
71. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Servs., 528 U.S. 167, 181 (2000).
72. Donald R. Steinberg & Vera A. Shmidt, Can an Industry Group Appeal an Unfavorable
IPR Decision?, BNA’ S P ATENT, T RADEMARK & COP YRIGHT J. (Nov. 24, 2017),
http://documents.jdsupra.com/c8a7b9d3-437c-423a-9a02-0dd527af3d48.pdf.
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Trademark Office, 73 which consisted of a coalition of interest groups. 74 For a
relevant case in the closely related Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB)
context, which is also beyond the scope of this Article, look to Jewelers
Vigilance Committee v. Ullenberg Corp. 75 for a detailed discussion. And note
that governmental organizational standing may also play a role; at least one
scholar, Tara Grove, has recently questioned whether governmental
organizations should be allowed to be plaintiffs alleging “institutional
injuries.”76
An important issue regarding associational standing is whether claim
preclusion will apply against the members of the association based on litigation
brought by the association. Like other aspects of standing, the application of
claim preclusion against the association’s members is fact-dependent. 77
III.

APPELLANT STANDING

To date, the Federal Circuit has only ruled on a handful of cases addressing
standing to appeal from a PTAB decision. The first set of cases concerns the
question of appellant standing. In analyzing these cases, bear in mind any
question about standing is highly fact-dependent, and standing before the
Federal Circuit will, in many cases, be difficult to predict. The myriad of
potential factual scenarios leave plenty of opportunity for further standing
rulings from the court. That said, the following analyses sets out a rough
framework for how to best approach the issue.
A. Consumer Watchdog
The Federal Circuit first confronted the standing issue in a pre-AIA appeal,
Consumer Watchdog v. Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation. 78 The case
73. 467 Fed. App’x 890 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
74. Id. (deciding Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 566 U.S. 902
(2012) on remand).
75. 823 F.2d 490, 490, 492 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (discussing associational standing to appeal a
T T AB proceeding).
76. T ara L. Grove, Governmental Standing and the Fallacy of Institutional Injury, 167 U. PA.
L. REV. 3 (forthcoming 2019). T he question has tangential relevance to the recently granted Return
Mail, Inc. v. United States Postal Service case, which asks wheth er governmental organizations are
“ persons” for purposes of the IPR and CBM statutes of the AIA. No. 17 -1594, slip op. at 1 (U.S.
Oct. 26, 2018) (order granting cert as to question 1: “ Whether the government is a “ person” who
may petition to institute review proceedings under the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act.”).
77. See United Food & Commercial Workers Union Local 751 v. Brown Grp., Inc., 517 U.S.
544, 556 n.6 (1996) (“The germaneness of a suit to an association’s purpose may, of course, satisfy
a standing requirement without necessarily rendering the association ’s representation adequate to
justify giving the association’s suit preclusive effect as against an individual ostensibly
represented.”); Int’l Union v. Brock, 477 U.S. 274, 290 (1986) (“Should an association be deficient
[in regard to whether it is an adequate representative of its injured members], a judgment won
against it might not preclude subsequent claims by the association ’s members without offending
due process principles.”).
78. 753 F.3d 1258 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
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concerned patents relating to human embryonic stem cell cultures owned by the
Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation (WARF). 79 The patent challenge
focused on whether stem cells were patent-eligible subject matter; the standing
issue arose as an afterthought. 80 According to its website, “Consumer Watchdog
[formerly, the Foundation for Taxpayer and Consumer Rights] is a nonprofit
organization dedicated to providing an effective voice for taxpayers and
consumers in an era when special interests dominate public discourse,
government and politics.”81 As a nonprofit, Consumer Watchdog rarely
concerns itself with patent rights, but the changing landscape of patent eligibility
law, together with patent office reexaminations, created an opportunity for the
advocacy group to push back on what it believed were invalid patents, which
“loot taxpayer funds and force research overseas.”82 Thus, the patent challenge,
in Consumer Watchdog’s view, furthered its institutional goals of benefiting
consumers and the public at large.
The WARF patents at issue covered human embryonic stem cells. 83 Because
the WARF patents were widely licensed to researchers doing embryonic stem
cell research and held significance in the research world, Consumer Watchdog
requested an inter partes reexamination of these patents. 84 After the PTO failed
to cancel the challenged claims as requested, Consumer Watchdog appealed to
the Federal Circuit, seeking judicial review of the PTAB’s decision. 85 As the
party “seeking to invoke federal jurisdiction,” Consumer Watchdog bore the
burden of establishing Article III standing, which included proving that it
suffered an “injury in fact.”86 Because Consumer Watchdog had “not allege[d]
that it [was] engaged in any activity involving human embryonic stem cells that
could form the basis for an infringement claim,” the Federal Circuit held that it
had failed to establish an injury in fact. 87
Crucially, Consumer Watchdog conceded that it had neither connection to the
patent at issue nor the claimed subject matter, other than alleging, without
supporting evidence, that WARF’s “broad and aggressive assertion of [its]
patent has put a severe burden on taxpayer-funded research in the State of
California where [Consumer Watchdog] is located.”88 According to Consumer

79. Id. at 1260.
80. Id.
81. About, CONSUMER W ATCHDOG , http://www.consumerwatchdog.org/about (last visited
Dec. 15, 2018).
82. Groups Challenge Stem Cell Patents that Loot Taxpayer Funds and Force Research
Oversees: Univ. of Wisconsin Affiliate Claims Rights to All Embryonic Stem Cells Used for
Research, P UB. P ATENT FOUND . (Jul. 18, 2006), http://www.pubpat.org/warfstemcellsfiled.htm.
83. Consumer Watchdog, 753 F.3d at 1260.
84. Id. at 1260, 1262.
85. Id. at 1260–61.
86. Id. (citing Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 –61 (1992)).
87. Id. at 1261–62.
88. Id. at 1260.
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Watchdog, it filed the reexamination request because “it was concerned that the
[patent at issue] allowed WARF to completely preempt all uses of human
embryonic stem cells, particularly those for scientific and medical research.”89
The Federal Circuit found that Consumer Watchdog suffered no injury in fact
because the PTAB’s decision “did not invade any legal right conferred upon
Consumer Watchdog[,]” which “was not denied anything to which it was
entitled.”90 It was not threatened with suit; indeed, it did not practice the
invention and would not have been harmed by an assertion or the existence of
the patent per se. So while it was able to invoke administrative review, the court
noted that “[a] statutory grant of a procedural right, e.g., right to appeal, does not
eliminate the requirements of Article III.”91 For example, “the statutory grant
of a procedural right does not eliminate the requirement that [a party must] have
a particularized, concrete stake in the outcome of the [administrative
proceeding].”92
A statutory procedural right also “distinguishe[d] the [] inquiry from that
governing a declaratory judgment action.”93 In the declaratory judgment
context, jurisdiction turns on “whether the facts alleged, under all the
circumstances, show that there is a substantial controversy, between parties
having adverse legal interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the
issuance of a declaratory judgment.”94 Applying this “all the circumstances”
test, the Federal Circuit has held that a declaratory judgment plaintiff “must
allege both (1) an affirmative act by the patentee related to the enforcement of
his patent rights . . . and (2) meaningful preparation to conduct potentially
infringing activity.”95 By contrast, while a patent challenger with the statutory
right to appeal a PTAB decision must assert an injury in fact to establish
standing, the injury need not be imminent or likely to be redressed by a favorable
decision. 96
B. Phigenix, Inc.
The next case in which the Federal Circuit examined standing on an appeal
from the PTAB—the first in the post-AIA context—was Phigenix, Inc. v.

89. Id.
90. Id. at 1262.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 127 (2007) (quoting Md. Cas. Co. v.
Pac. Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273 (1941)).
95. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & T rademark Office , 689 F.3d 1303, 1318
(Fed. Cir. 2012) rev’d on other grounds, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc.,
569 U.S. 576, 596 (2013).
96. See Consumer Watchdog, 753 F.3d at 1262 (“ A statutory grant of a procedural right may
relax the requirements of immediacy and redressability, and eliminate any prudential limitations.”)
(citing Mass. v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 517–18 (2007)).
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ImmunoGen, Inc.. 97 In Phigenix, an appeal from an unfavorable inter partes
review (IPR), the Federal Circuit laid out the evidentiary and legal requirements
of administrative standing on appeal, and found that the appellant had not borne
its burden to demonstrate that it had Article III standing on appeal. 98
While the court adopted the appellant’s legal theory for analyzing standing, it
found that the evidence failed to prove an injury in fact. 99 This is encouraging,
as the majority of standing opinions at the Federal Circuit, not surprisingly, focus
solely on patent infringement or the threat thereof, and limiting the appellate
standing inquiry to just the question of infringement or threat of infringement
could have been, in our view, unduly limiting and not in line with the broader
inquiry endorsed by the high court and the other Circuits. Thus, while Phigenix
was a “loss” for the appellant, it was a win for those advocating for standing
beyond the threat of infringement analysis typically applied by the Federal
Circuit in declaratory judgment actions. 100
The appellant, Phigenix, was a small research company seeking to license its
own technology relating to conjugates of an antibody with an anticancer
agent. 101 ImmunoGen gave a license for the ‘856 patent to Genentech, which
then produced the FDA-approved drug Kadcyla. 102 Phigenix contended that the
use and sale of Kadcyla infringed Phigenix’s patent ‘534. 103 Genentech declined
to take a license for Phigenix’s patent. 104 At the time, Genentech had taken a
“worldwide exclusive license” to ImmunoGen’s ‘856 patent for the use and sale
of Kadcyla. 105 Given Genentech’s existing legal obligation to pay ImmunoGen
for the ‘856 patent license, Phigenix viewed ImmunoGen’s ‘856 patent as the
primary reason Genentech declined to license Phigenix’s patent. 106 Phrased
another way, in Phigenix’s view, the existence of ImmunoGen’s ‘856 patent was
causing financial harm to Phigenix. 107
To remedy this harm, Phigenix sought to cancel the claims of the ‘856
patent. 108 Phigenix filed an inter partes review (IPR) petition, asserting that the
claims of ImmunoGen’s ‘856 patent were obvious. 109 The PTAB ultimately held

97. 845 F.3d 1168 (Fed. Cir. 2017). As a point of disclosure, this Article’s author Matthew
Dowd was the principal author of the appellant ’s briefs in Phigenix but did not argue the appeal.
98. Id. at 1172–75.
99. Id. at 1172–74.
100. Id. at 1173–75.
101. Id. at 1170.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 1174.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1170.
109. Id.
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that Phigenix had not proven by a preponderance of the evidence that the claims
were obvious. 110 Phigenix then appealed to the Federal Circuit. 111
On appeal, ImmunoGen raised the issue of Phigenix’s standing in a motion to
dismiss—a somewhat rare occurrence on appeal. 112 ImmunoGen sought to
dismiss the appeal prior to traditional briefing. 113 The court declined
ImmunoGen’s invitation for an early dismissal, instead ordering the parties to
proceed with briefing on the merits. 114
The court faced several novel issues that distinguished this case from
Consumer Watchdog. The court noted that “[i]n the nearly thirty-five years
since the court’s inception, [it has] not established the legal standard for
demonstrating standing in an appeal from a final agency action.” 115 The court
explained, “This standard must identify the burden of production; the evidence
an appellant must produce to meet that burden; and when an appellant must
produce that evidence.”116
Here, the court applied the approach adopted by the D.C. Circuit and several
other federal circuit courts, holding that “an appellant’s burden of production is
‘the same as that of a plaintiff moving for summary judgment in the district
court.’”117 The court also concluded that this evidence may come from record
evidence, or it may be supplemented on appeal; though the court, like the D.C.
Circuit, admonished that “if there is no record evidence to support standing, the
appellant must produce such evidence at the appellate level at the earliest
possible opportunity.”118
The court determined that Phigenix’s evidence was insufficient. 119 By way of
an expert declaration, Phigenix had presented evidence, on appeal, that “[t]he
existence of ImmunoGen’s ‘856 patent has . . . encumber[ed] Phigenix’s
licensing efforts.”120 Phigenix also provided “a letter highlighting concerns over
the ‘856 patent’s validity that its attorney sent to ImmunoGen [which] ‘underscores the actual, concrete controversy’ between the parties.”121 The Phigenix
letter also stated that Phigenix “believes that it has a strong patent portfolio [and]
‘believes’ that the ‘856 patent is invalid.”122 In short, the submitted evidence

110.
2015).
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Phigenix, Inc. v. ImmunoGen, Inc., IPR 2014 -00676, 2015 WL 6550500, at *1 (P.T.A.B.
Phigenix, 845 F.3d at 1170.
Id. at 1170–71.
Id.
Id. at 1171.
Id. at 1172.
Id.
Id. (citing Sierra Club v. EPA, 292 F.3d 895, 899 (D.C. Cir. 2002)).
Id. at 1173.
Id. at 1174.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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attempted to establish the Phigenix’s injury—that is, Phigenix’s inability to
license its own patent to Genentech—was attributable to the existence of
ImmunoGen’s ‘856 patent. 123
As noted, the court was unpersuaded by Phigenix’s evidence. 124 The court
relied on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c)(4), which requires that a
“declaration used to support . . . a motion must be made on personal knowledge,
set out facts that would be admissible in evidence, and show that the . . . declarant
is competent to testify on the matters stated.”125 Phigenix’s evidence of “[t]he
conclusory statements in the Gold Declaration and the letter as to the
hypothetical licensing injury . . . [did] not satisfy the requirements of Rule
56(c)(4).”126
Importantly, the court found Phigenix’s standing lacking, but did not reject
Phigenix’s legal theory of injury in fact. 127 The court expressly acknowledged
that “if Phigenix had licensed the ‘534 patent to the same parties to which
ImmunoGen had licensed the ‘856 patent, the invalidation of the ‘856 patent
might have increased Phigenix’s revenues.”128 Decreased revenue is a classic
financial harm that can satisfy the injury in fact requirement of Article III. 129
Phigenix is an important case in several respects. For one, the Circuit, for the
first time, articulated a test and the burdens for appellate standing from
administrative actions—one broader than the test used for establishing
declaratory judgment jurisdiction. 130 ImmunoGen argued that standing was
controlled entirely by Consumer Watchdog and, therefore, Phigenix lacked
standing because it failed to establish any threat of an infringement suit. 131 The
court rejected this narrow view of standing, and instead acknowledged that,
under certain circumstances, the ‘856 patent could have negatively affected
Phigenix’s revenues. 132 Second, it highlighted the type of evidence that could
be offered, and provided guidance as to when such evidence should be presented,

123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. (quoting FED . R. CIV. P. 56(c)(4)).
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. See Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 154 (1970)
(“ Certainly he who is ‘likely to be financially’ injured, may be a reliable private attorney general
to litigate the issues of the public interest in the present case.”) (citation omitted); White v. United
States, 601 F.3d 545, 552 (6th Cir. 2010) (noting that “ economic injuries may constitute an injuryin-fact for the purposes of Article III standing.”); Lambert v. Hartman, 517 F.3d 433, 438 (6th Cir.
2008) (finding that the allegation of stolen identity and the resulting negative credit rating and
financial security impacts provided sufficient injury to confer standing).
130. See Phigenix, 845 F.3d at 1172–75 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (adopting a three-part test for standing
in an appeal from a final agency action that is broader than the test for standing in a declaratory
judgment action).
131. Id. at 1175–76.
132. Id. at 1174.
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and how. 133 Thus, Phigenix’s failure on appeal was not its legal theory but its
evidentiary failure of proof. Third, it established that, sometimes, the standing
issue is best decided with the merits of an appellate opinion; in others, through
a motion to dismiss. 134 These all have important procedural and strategic
implications.
C. PPG Industries
The next Federal Circuit standing case was PPG Industries, Inc. v. Valspar
Sourcing, Inc.. 135 The opinion was non-precedential;136 it thus does not bind
future disputes. However, it does provide some insight into what certain judges
believe is sufficient to establish standing on appeal from the PTAB.
The dispute in PPG Industries arose as an inter partes reexamination of two
patents owned by the appellee, Valspar. 137 When PPG filed the IPR regarding
Valspar’s patents, “there was no pending district court litigation” involving the
patents. 138 There was also no patent litigation regarding the two patents between
the parties during the length of the reexaminations. 139 The PTAB concluded the
reexaminations in favor of the patent owner, Valspar; PPG then appealed to the
Federal Circuit for judicial review. 140
On appeal, Valspar’s first argument was that, “PPG had no standing to appeal
the PTAB decisions because there was no Article III case or controversy.” 141 In
response, the courtsitting as a three-judge panelrequested additional
briefing from the parties on the standing dispute. 142 Part of Valspar’s additional
briefing identified a covenant not to sue, which Valspar unilaterally granted to
PPG. It is reproduced in part below:
[Valspar] covenant[s] not to sue PPG Industries, Inc. or any of its
subsidiaries or customers (collectively, ‘PPG’) for infringement of any
claim of [U.S. Patent No. 7,592,047] or [U.S. Patent No. 8,092,876]
as of the date of this Covenant Not To Sue based on PPG’s
manufacture, importation, use, sale and/or offer for sale of any
currently existing products or use of methods and of prior existing
products or prior use of methods. 143

133. Id. at 1172–75
134. Id.
135. 679 Fed. App’x 1002 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
136. Id. at 1002.
137. Id. at 1003–04.
138. Id. at 1004.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 1002, 2004.
143. Id. at 1004. T he court’s opinion does not state when the covenant not to sue was executed,
but the document in the court ’s record indicates that it was executed on November 15, 2016.
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The parties also briefed the issue of whether the appeal was moot based on
the covenant not to sue. 144 The court then ruled on jurisdiction and mootness.145
In a short, non-precedential opinion, the Federal Circuit held that PPG did
establish standing to sue at the time the appeal was filed, but that the appeal was
moot. 146 The opinion’s standing analysis is terse, but it does identify several
pieces of evidence that guided the court’s standing determination. The court
explained that:
(1) by the time PPG filed its notice of appeal in this case, it had already
launched a commercial can-interior coating for the beverage can
industry; and (2) PPG had received at least one inquiry from a
customer suggesting that Valspar intended to pursue infringement
litigation against PPG related to its can-interior coating. 147
Thus, the court concluded that PPG had standing under Article III. 148 The
court distinguished PPG’s case from the facts in Consumer Watchdog in two
ways:
Unlike Consumer Watchdog, PPG is and was ‘engaged in . . . activity
involving [the patented subject matter] that could form the basis for an
infringement claim,’ and has ‘other connection[s] to the [patents] or
the claimed subject matter,’ sufficient to ‘have a particularized,
concrete stake in the outcome of the reexamination.’ 149
In the court’s view, “[t]his stake is enhanced by the ‘estoppel provisions
contained within the inter partes reexamination statute.’”150
Although the court’s analysis is short, one point is worth noting: the court’s
analysis appears to parallel—or at least draw from—the traditional standing
analysis for declaratory judgment actions. The court noted that PPG had begun
making or selling a can-interior coating, which was presumably a product that
PPG believed would cause Valspar to base an infringement claim on. 151 The
court also noted that at least one of PPG’s customers informed PPG of Valspar’s
infringement concern. 152 While the evidence did not show an expressed threat
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. (stating “ the controversy as to the patented subject matter is mooted by the Covenant
Not T o Sue”).
147. Id. (citations omitted).
148. Id.
149. Id. at 1005 (citation omitted) (citing Consumer Watchdog v. Wis. Alumni Research
Found., 753 F.3d 1258, 1261–62 (Fed. Cir. 2014)).
150. Id. (citing Consumer Watchdog, 753 F.3d at 1262).
151. Id. at 1004.
152. Id. T he panel’s conclusion appears to rest on the concept of supplier standing based on a
customer being accused of infringement. It is worth noting that, for a supplier to establish standing,
the supplier must show more than merely that a customer was accused of infringement. See
Microsoft Corp. v. DataT ern, Inc., 755 F.3d 899, 903 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (noting that the supplier must
show more than mere accusation of infringement to establish standing) (citing Arris Grp., Inc. v.
British T elecomms. PLC., 639 F.3d 1368, 137 5 (Fed. Cir. 2011)); Cisco Sys. Inc. v. Alberta
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of suit by Valspar against PPG, the evidence was similar to the type that was
sufficient to establish standing in previous patent declaratory judgment
actions. 153
PPG Industries is, as noted, a non-precedential decision. It would be unwise
to read too much into the conclusions. Nonetheless, the opinion presents
guideposts for establishing appellant standing on appeal from the PTAB; the
exact force of those guideposts will likely be tested in future litigation.
D. Mylan Pharmaceuticals
Another case addressing appellant standing in the AIA context is Mylan
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Research Corp. Technologies. 154 As of the time of
writing, the court has not ruled on the presented standing issue; therefore, the
following issues are raised with possible outcomes. Mylan raises a novel
standing issue relevant to both appellant standing and joinder of petitioners
under 35 U.S.C. § 315.
Mylan is an appeal from an IPR involving a patent directed to an FDAapproved antiepileptic drug, Vimpat, which contains lacosamide. 155 Patent ‘551
at issue was owned by Research Corporation and licensed to UCB, which
marketed Vimpat. 156 The active component, lacosamide, was specifically
claimed in the ‘551 patent but had previously been the subject of patent
protection in two separate U.S. patents, which had expired by the time of the
IPR. 157 This IPR was filed by a generic drug company called Argentum
Pharmaceuticals. 158 Argentum was not the first company to challenge the ‘551
patent. 159 In fact, several other generic companies had already begun similar

T elecomms. Research Ctr., 538 Fed. App’x 894, 897–98 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (nonprecedential)
(holding that it lacked declaratory judgment jurisdiction over a contributory infringement claim
because the patentee “ conceded that there are substantial non-infringing uses of [the declaratory
judgment plaintiff’s] products”); Microchip T ech. Inc. v. Chamberlain Grp., Inc., 441 F.3d 936,
944 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (holding it lacked declaratory judgment jurisdiction because “ there is no
indication that [the declaratory judgment plaintiff] is inducing or contributing to infringement by
its customers”).
153. PPG Indus., 679 Fed. App’x at 1004–05.
154. See generally Mot. Dismiss, Mylan Pharm., Inc. v. Research Corp. T ech., Nos. 20172088, -2089, -2091 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 3, 2017).
155. Mot. Dismiss, Mylan Pharm., Nos. 2017-2088, -2089, -2091, ECF No. 31-1, Ex. 3 at ¶¶
13, 15.
156. Id. at 9 & Ex. 3 ¶¶ 22–24.
157. Id. at Ex. 3 ¶¶ 12–20.
158. Mot. Dismiss, supra note 154, at 6.
159. Carly Helfand, UCB’s Vimpat Prevails in Patent Challenge—but IPR Threat Still Lurks,
FIERCE P HARMA (Aug. 15, 2016), https://www.fiercepharma.com/pharma/ucb-s-vimpat-prevailspatentchallenge-but-ipr-threat-still-lurks.
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litigation in district court, seeking to invalidate the ‘551 patent to ultimately
bring a less expensive, generic version of Vimpat to market. 160
Sometime after the district court litigation commenced, several of the generic
drug companies filed an IPR petition against the ‘551 patent. 161 That petition
was denied and those defendants were barred from filing a second IPR petition
under 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) because it had been more than one year since they
were sued for infringing the ‘551 patent. 162 At that point, Argentum filed an IPR
petition, and the PTAB instituted review of the ‘551 patent based on Argentum’s
petition. 163 Argentum’s petition was not identical to the earlier petition filed by
the district court defendants. 164 Once instituted, several of the district court
defendants filed follow-on IPR petitions, which were essentially identical to
Argentum’s petition. 165 The follow-on petitions were granted, and the followon petitioners were joined to Argentum’s petition with the understanding that
Argentum would be the lead party presenting arguments to the PTAB. 166
The PTAB ruled in favor of the patent owner, leading to the current pending
appeal before the Federal Circuit. 167 Argentum opted not to appeal, but the
joinder petitioners, including Mylan, did appeal. 168 In response, the patent
owner RCT filed a motion to dismiss based on a novel theory. 169
RCT’s argument relies on the statutory time bar for filing an IPR along with
a “zone of interests” analysis under Article III. 170 First, RCT argued that
“[a]ppellants now attempt to evade the time bar of § 315(b) and invoke the
jurisdiction of this Court by seeking judicial review of the final written decision
in an IPR that was instituted at the behest of a different entity,” namely
Argentum. 171 RCT argued that, because the appellants’ petitions were granted
on condition that they were joined to Argentum’s IPR, the appellants are not a
“party” for purposes of § 319, which grants “[a] ‘party’ dissatisfied with [the]

160. UCB Faces U.S. Patent Challenge for Epilepsy Drug, REUTERS (May 24, 2016),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ucb-sa-patent/ucb-faces-u-s-patentchallenge-for-epilepsydrug-idUSKCN0YF0 VP.
161. Mot. Dismiss, supra note 154, at 6.
162. Id. at 1.
163. Id. at 7–8.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 8–9. (“ T he accompanying IPR petitions filed by the three Appellants were,
according to Appellants and as recognized by the PT AB, ‘practical copies of’ and ‘substantially
identical in content to’ Argentum’s petition.”).
166. Id. at 14–15.
167. Id. at 15–16.
168. Id. at 16.
169. Id. at 11–22.
170. Id. at 6–7.
171. Id. at 6.
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final written decision of the PTAB” the right to appeal to the Federal Circuit.172
RCT’s argument relies on a zone of interests argument. 173
It is too early to tell whether the Federal Circuit will accept RCT’s argument.
At a minimum, it is a novel, untested theory applying the zone of interests
analysis to the standing inquiry in the PTAB context. A major hurdle appears
to be that § 319 grants the right of appeal to any party to an IPR proceeding, and
the generic drug company appellants were certainly parties to the underlying
IPR. Section 319 is even more forceful, as it expressly states that “[a]ny party
to the inter partes review shall have the right to be a party to the appeal.” 174
Section 319 appears to be one of those statutes that expands, as broadly as
permitted under the Constitution, the right to appeal, and litigate, under Article
III. In other words, § 319 arguably eliminates any consideration of prudential
standing. 175
E. Altaire Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Paragon Bioteck, Inc. 176
The next-decided Altaire case involved the rare post-grant review (PGR)
petition, and involved two closely related parties, Altair Pharmaceuticals Inc.
and Paragon Bioteck, Inc. 177 Here, the parties contracted that Paragon would
pursue FDA approval and Altair would develop and manufacture a certain
drug. 178 Outside of the agreement, Paragon filed a patent application that issued
into the patent in dispute here. 179
Once Altaire became aware of the patent, it sued Paragon for breach of
contract; Paragon counterclaimed with a DJ action to exit the contract. 180 Altaire
filed a PGR arguing obviousness over drug lots it had manufactured before the
relevant priority date. 181 The PTAB instituted, but ultimately held that Altaire
failed its burden to prove obviousness. 182
Standing was raised on appeal. 183 Interestingly, Altaire was contractually
bound not to manufacture a competing, infringing product for years. 184
Nevertheless, the court found that Altaire clearly intended to file an ANDA once

172. Id. at 6–7.
173. Id. at 24 (“ Appellants are not within the zone of interests required to pursue a cause of
action for judicial review of the agency action under Section 319.”).
174. 35 U.S.C. § 319 (2012).
175. See id.
176. 889 F.3d 1274 (Fed. Cir. 2018), remand order modified by stipulation, 738 Fed. App’x
1017 (Fed Cir. 2018).
177. Id. at 1277.
178. Id. at 1278.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 1279.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 1280.
183. Id. at 1280–81.
184. Id. at 1291 (Schall, dissenting).
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its agreement terminated, and given the DJ action, injury was inevitable. 185 The
court pointed to the estoppel as compounding the harm. 186 Ultimately, it held
that Altair had standing to appeal. 187
F. JTEKT Corp. v. GKN Automotive, Ltd. 188
In JTEKT Corp. v. GKN Automotive Ltd., the Federal Circuit, in a fully briefed
written opinion, held that appellant JTEKT lacked Article III standing. 189 The
court noted that an JTEKT sold no infringing goods, and thus would have had
to establish “concrete plans for future activity that create[] a substantial risk of
future infringement or likely cause the patentee to assert a claim of
infringement.”190 The court here found JTEKT had not provided enough
evidence of concrete, particularized harm, as its product design was not final and
thus, its risk of infringing GKN’s patent or being threatened by it was
speculative. 191 The Federal Circuit rejected JTEKT’s argument that IPR
estoppel constitutes a separate injury in fact, 192 the same argument that would
become the primary issue in RPX v. Chanbond, as we will see below.
G. E. I. du Pont de Nemours v. Synvina C.V. 193
Roughly two weeks later, the Federal Circuit issued E. I. du Pont de Nemours
v. Synvina, finding that an operating facility that was capable of infringing a
method of manufacture, in that case, sufficed to confer standing on a petitionerappellant. 194 There, DuPont was a known competitor of Synvina in the larger
sense, and was known to at least seek to compete with methods of manufacture
of 2,5-Furandicarboxylic acid (FDCA) that could infringe the patent. 195 On
appeal, patent owner Synvina argued that DuPont did not have standing to
maintain the appeal, as it had not suffered injury that was actual or imminent.196
In an opinion written by Judge Lourie and joined in full by Judges O’Malley and
Chen, the Federal Circuit found that on appeal from PTAB proceedings, a
petitioner-appellant “must generally show a controversy ‘of sufficient
immediacy and reality’ to warrant the requested judicial relief.”197 Then it found
185. Id. at 1282.
186. Id. at 1283.
187. Id. at 1284.
188. 898 F.3d 1217 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
189. Id. at 1218.
190. Id. at 1221.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. 904 F.3d 996 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
194. Id. at 1004–05.
195. Id. at 999.
196. Id. at 1003.
197. Id. at 1004 (quoting MedImmune, Inc. v. Genetech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 127 (2007))
(emphasis added).
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that “DuPont ‘is engaged or will likely engage in an[] activity that would give
rise to a possible infringement suit.’”198 The panel deemed this potentiality as
of sufficient immediacy and likelihood as to merit appellate standing, further
belying the context-specific nature of the inquiry. 199
H. Momenta Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. 200
Bristol-Myers Squibb markets a biologic product, Orencia®, a CTLA4Ig
protein formulation (abatacept) useful for treating autoimmune diseases like
rheumatoid
arthritis. 201 Potential
biosimilar
competitor Momenta
Pharmaceuticals, in partnership with Mylan, made plans to market a biosimilar
version, but first sought to challenge one of the patents covering the formulation,
U.S. Patent 8,476,239 (“the ʼ239 patent”), as obvious. 202 The Board instituted
but held that petitioner failed its burden to demonstrate the claims were
obvious. 203
The unsuccessful petitioner, Momenta, appealed, arguing on the merits that
the Board erroneously found there was no reasonable expectation of success in
combining the references to create the liquid protein formulations in the ʼ239
patent claims. 204
The case has been pending for quite some time. On December 5, 2017, the
Federal Circuit held oral argument, with Judges Chen, Dyk, and Newman
presiding. 205 The oral argument was dedicated entirely to the issue of standing
and the remedy for an appeal lacking standing. 206
Momenta argued in briefing and at oral argument that this IPR represented a
“freedom-to-operate” action resulting in immediate harm, as it was at “fork in
the road” in the development process, and that losing the ability to appeal would
mean it would be forced to abandon its research efforts and millions of dollars
would be wasted. 207 Bristol-Myers Squibb argued the harm was speculative.208
The decision did not issue after the oral argument; nearly 11 months later, the
Federal Circuit issued a show cause order after the parties indicated that
Momenta had initiated discussions, in conjunction with its development partner
198. Id. at 1005. (quoting JT EKT Corp. v. GKN Auto., Ltd., 898 F.3d 1217, 1220 (Fed. Cir.
2018)).
199. Id.
200. No. 17-1694 (Fed. Cir. argued Dec. 5, 2017).
201. Brief for Petitioner-Appellant at *5, Momenta Pharms. v. Bristol-Myers Squibb, No. 171694 (Fed. Cir. Jul. 10, 2017).
202. Id. at *19.
203. Id. at *2–3.
204. Id. at *29.
205. Oral Argument, Momenta Pharms., No. 17-1694 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 5, 2017).
206. Id.
207. Citation of Supplemental Authority for Petitioner-Appellant at *2, Momenta Pharms., No.
17-1694 (Fed. Cir. June 4, 2018).
208. Reply Brief for Appellee at *2, Momenta Pharms., No. 17-1694 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 22, 2017).
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Mylan, “to exit its participation in the development of M834, a proposed
biosimilar of ORENCIA®,” which would have been the basis of its patent
challenge and the justification for its appellate standing. 209 Bristol-Myers Squbb
argued that the case was moot; in responsive briefing on November 2, Momenta
maintained otherwise. 210 It noted that they had not yet exited the partnership,
that they still maintained a financial stake in the development of a competitor
product, and they noted that “[t]he concreteness of that stake is bolstered by the
estoppel provision, which the Board’s adverse decision already triggered,” citing
35 U.S.C. § 315(e). 211 The dispute shows the difficult position the court and
parties are put in when standing is raised based on proactive business decisions
revolving around patent challenges, and also demonstrates how principles of
mootness and ripeness bleed into the standing inquiry easily. As of this writing,
the issue remains unresolved.
I. RPX Corp. v. Chanbond212
In RPX Corp. v. Chanbond, entity RPX Corp., which bills itself as a patent
litigation risk reduction solution, filed an IPR against Chanbond, was successful
in earning institution of that IPR, but lost on the merits as to all claims and
grounds. 213 RPX appealed, and Chanbond filed a motion to dismiss for lack of
Article III standing. 214 RPX countered that it was not sued or charged with
infringement, but argued that the estoppel effect and the reputational harm from
losing a post-grant challenge conferred standing upon them. 215 The Federal
Circuit ruled in favor of Chanbond and dismissed, finding RPX had not carried
its burden as appellant to show it had independent Article III standing. 216 RPX
forwent filing a request for en banc review, and proceeded to file a brief for
certiorari to the Supreme Court, 217 which drew amicus support from the New
York Intellectual Property Law Association. 218 When the high court considered
the petition during the long conference, the Supreme Court called for the views
of the Solicitor General, suggesting there is some interest and the Court may be
likely to grant the petition. 219 Its argument is predicated on the idea that the
209. See Show Cause Order, Momenta Pharms., No. 17-0694 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 23, 2018).
210. Response to Order to Show Cause for Petitioner-Appellant at *1, Momenta Pharms., No.
17-0694 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 2, 2018) (“ T his appeal is not moot because Momenta continues to have a
concrete interest, just as it did when it filed the appeal.”).
211. Id. at *4.
212. No. 17-2346 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 17, 2018).
213. Id. at *1–2.
214. Id. at *2.
215. Id. at *2, *4.
216. Id. at *6.
217. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, RPX Corp., No. 17-1686 (U.S. June 18, 2018).
218. Brief for the New York Intellectual Property Law Association as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Neither Party, RPX Corp., No. 17-1686 (U.S. Jul. 20, 2018).
219. RPX Corp., No. 17-1686, slip op. at 1 (U.S. Oct. 1, 2018) (“ T he Solicitor General is
invited to file briefs in these cases expressing the views of the United States.”).
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estoppel provisions and the statute alone confer standing on administrative
challengers, thus ending the inquiry—a stance in seeming conflict with that
settled upon by the Federal Circuit in Consumer Watchdog and its progeny.
III.

APPELLEE ST ANDING IN PTAB APPEALS

Standing also arises in the context of whether a defending appellee must
satisfy the requirements for standing under Article III. 220 While there is some
debate as to whether an appellee must show standing separately, many courts
state that if standing is met for one party, it is met for all. 221 Indeed, the issue
has only been addressed once by the Federal Circuit. 222 There is a subsidiary
question of whether—statutorily reducible—prudential standing limitations
might be applicable when constitutional standing is not at issue. 223
A. Personal Audio, LLC v. Electronic Frontier Foundation
The case addressing these issues is Personal Audio, LLC v. Electronic
Frontier Foundation. 224 In Personal Audio, the Federal Circuit decided whether
an appellee must establish Article III standing to defend a favorable opinion—
an issue rarely litigated. 225 The generally accepted presumption that the appellee
has standing is based on the risk of an opinion adverse to the appellee. 226 This
is analogous to a defendant’s right to defend. 227 Although not directly addressed
by any Supreme Court cases, the Federal Circuit granted standing to the
appellee-petitioner. In Personal Audio, the court sua sponte requested briefing
on the following:
whether [the appellee had] standing to participate in [the] appeal, in
view of the court’s holding in Consumer Watchdog v. Wisconsin
Alumni Research Foundation that a PTAB petitioner that does not
meet the Article III case-or-controversy requirement does not have
220. See Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Inst. Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 52 n.2 (2006)
(explaining that “ the presence of one party with standing is sufficient to satisfy Article III ’s caseor-controversy requirement ”); Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n v. United States, 987 F.2d 806, 810 (D.C.
Cir. 1993) (stating that “ if one party has standing in an action, a court need not reach the issue of
the standing of other parties when it makes no difference to the merits of the case”).
221. See, e.g., Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 987 F.2d at 810.
222. See Pers. Audio, LLC v. Elec. Frontier Found., 867 F.3d 1246, 1249 –50 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
223. See Consumer Watchdog v. Wis. Alumni Research Found., 753 F.3d 1258, 1261 (Fed.
Cir. 2014) (explaining how Congress may relax prudential standing requirements by statutorily
authorizing citizen suits); see also United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2685 –86 (2013)
(explaining the difference between Article III standing and prudential standing).
224. 867 F.3d 1246 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
225. Id. at 1249–50.
226. Steinman, supra note 16, at 853.
227. Id. at 852 (“ While a silent appellee cannot lose a case by ‘default’ as a defendant in the
trial court can under Rule 55 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, he would be disadvantaged
if barred from arguing to the court of appeals a version of the facts and the law that differs from
what the appellant is arguing.”).
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standing to invoke judicial power, and thus does not have standing to
appeal to this court from a PTAB decision on inter partes
reexamination. 228
The court cited two standing-to-sue cases 229 and ruled that “standing to appeal
is measured for the party ‘seek[ing] entry to the federal courts for the first time
in the lawsuit’ . . . With [the] Article III [requirement] satisfied as to the
appellant, [the appellee] is not constitutionally excluded from appearing in court
to defend the PTAB decision in its favor”. 230
The Federal Circuit did not discuss whether standing granted to one party
could provide standing for the opposing party. Instead, the court chose to simply
quote Justice Marshall: “Because respondent has not invoked the authority of
any federal court, then, federal standing principles are simply inapplicable to
him.”231 However, despite this judicial hand-waving, the opinion is in line with
other courts, which generally give the “defending party” the right to defend itself
before the court. 232
IV. ASSOCIAT IONAL ST ANDING IN PTAB APPEALS
Does an association has standing to litigate?233
Many industry and professional associations have challenged the validity of
patents, both administratively and judicially. 234 The challenge to gene patents
was spearheaded by the Association of Molecular Pathology. 235 The Federal
Circuit has not addressed the issue of associational standing in a PTAB case, 236
but this may be another source of standing disputes.
V.

INT ERVENOR (& GOVERNMENT AL ) ST ANDING

Standing issues most frequently arise with respect to the appellant or to a
lesser extent the appellee, but some cases also decide whether an intervenor

228. Pers. Audio, LLC, 867 F.3d at 1249 (citation omitted).
229. Id. (citing ASARCO Inc. v Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 618 (1989) ); U.S. Dep’t of Labor v.
T riplett, 494 U.S. 715, 732 (1990) (Marshall, J., concurring)).
230. Id. at 1250.
231. Id. (quoting Triplett, 494 U.S. at 732 (Marshall, J., concurring)).
232. Cf. Boston Edison Co. v. Boston Redevelopment Auth., 371 N.E.2d 728, 735–36 (Mass.
1977) (granting the appellee the right to “ present on appeal any ground which was previously
asserted below in support of the [favorable] judgement ”).
233. See, e.g., Jewelers Vigilance Comm., Inc. v. Ullenberg Corp., 823 F.2d 490, 494 –95 (Fed.
Cir. 1987) (holding that a jewelry trade association had standing to represent its member s in
opposing a trademark application before the T rademark T rial and Appeal Board).
234. See, e.g., Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & T rademark Office , 653 F.3d
1329, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (in which medical associations challenged a corporation’s patent with
the PT O).
235. See id. at 1333–34.
236. Cf. Jewelers Vigilance Comm., Inc., 823 F.2d at 494–95 (describing associational
standing requirements in similar T T AB appeals).
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satisfies the standing requirement. 237 In general, with patent litigation at the
appeals level, amici are more common than intervenors. 238 In recent years,
amicus activity has increased across the board, 239 and the same surely holds for
patent litigation. In AIA appeals, the PTO has the statutory right to participate
in an AIA appeal as an intervenor. 240 Federal Circuit appeals therefore routinely
include an intervenor, although the PTO intervenes in few cases. 241
An intervenor is neither an original plaintiff nor a defendant but has a legal
interest in the proceeding. 242 Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
authorizes an outside entity to intervene in a proceeding and participate “as if
the intervenor were an original party.”243 An entity may intervene as a matter of
right if that entity “(1) is given an unconditional right to intervene by a federal
statute; or (2) claims an interest relating to the property or transaction that is the
subject of the action [that would be] impair[ed] or impede[d]” without
intervention. 244 Permissive intervention can occur when a statute grants the
entity “a conditional right to intervene,” or when the person “has a claim or
defense that shares with the main action a common question of law or fact.” 245
Gaining status as an intervenor during a proceeding is important because the
intervenor becomes equal to the original parties and can fully litigate the issues

237. See, e.g., T own of Chester v. Laroe Estates, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1645, 1651 (2017) (holding
that, on a challenge to intervenors’ standing, intervenors of right must satisfy Article III standing
to seek relief different from that pursued by a party with standing).
238. See generally Mark D. Janis, Rethinking Reexamination: Toward a Viable Administrative
Revocation System for U.S. Patent Law, 11 HARV. J. LAW & T ECH . 1, 72–73, 73 n.320 (1997)
(explaining that “ [a]llowance of intervention or appearance as an amicus is within the discretion of
the court[,]” but even if a party is granted permission to intervene it must still have standing to
appeal, whereas there is no standing requirement to file amici).
239. Helen A. Anderson, Frenemies of the Court: The Many Faces of Amicus Curiae, 49 U.
RICHMOND L. REV. 361, 362 (2015) (“ Amicus curiae participation has surged in recent years,
primarily by interest and advocacy groups wishing to advance their law reform efforts and to gain
publicity.”); Paul M. Collins, Jr., Friends of the Court: Examining the Influence of Amicus Curiae
Participation in U.S. Supreme Court Litigation, 38 LAW & SOC’ Y REV. 807, 810–11 (2004).
240. 35 U.S.C. § 143 (2012).
241. See generally Craig Countryman, What can you do to maximize your chances of winning
an IPR appeal?, LEXOLOGY (June 4, 2015), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=2aa0
e624-1baf-4627-8624-62932f95b9f2 (explaining that, since the enactment of 35 U.S.C. § 143, the
PT O “ has been judicious about exercising this [intervention] authority ” because the appellee is
typically already present to defend the PT AB’s decision, making the PT O’s involvement not only
costly but redundant).
242. FED . R. CIV. P. 24(a) (defining an intervenor of right as anyone who “ claims an interest
relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the action, and is so situated that
disposing of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the movant ’s ability to protect
its interest”).
243. 7C CHARLES ALAN W RIGHT ET AL ., FEDERAL P RACTICE & P ROCEDURE § 1920 (3d ed.
Apr. 2016 update).
244. FED . R. CIV. P. 24(a).
245. FED . R. CIV. P. 24(b)(1)–(2).
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on the merits. 246 For example, an intervenor can undertake all the usual actions,
such as asserting claims and defenses, making demands for particular relief,
making discovery requests, presenting oral argument, and the like. 247 An
intervenor is therefore very different than an amicus curiae, which is limited to
supporting the claims and defenses raised by the actual litigants. 248 An
intervenor is a true party to the case and may even exert substantial “control
[over] the suit.”249
Left unanswered until recently was the question of whether an intervenor
needed to satisfy Article III’s standing requirement. Over the years, the federal
appellate courts have reached conflicting decisions on this question. 250
In 2017, the Supreme Court resolved the issue of whether an intervenor of
right must show Article III standing if that intervenor is seeking additional relief.
In Town of Chester v. Laroe Estates, 251 a unanimous Court ruled narrowly and
found a solution in which the parties and the United States, as amicus curiae,
shared agreement. 252 The Court held that “an intervenor of right must have
Article III standing in order to pursue relief that is different from that which is
sought by a party with standing.”253 In other words, “an intervenor of right must
demonstrate Article III standing when it seeks additional relief beyond that
246. Bethune Plaza, Inc. v. Lumpkin, 863 F.2d 525, 531 (7th Cir. 1988).
247. See Local No. 93, Int ’l Ass’n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 529
(1986) (discussing intervenors’ ability to present evidence); Bethune Plaza, Inc., 863 F.2d at 531
(discussing intervenors’ ability to demand separate relief and attorney’s fees). See generally S.
Carolina v. N. Carolina, 558 U.S. 256, 287 –88 (2010) (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (“ Intervenors do not come alone—they bring along more issues to decide, more
discovery requests . . . [and] make[] settling a case more difficult.”).
248. See Anderson, supra note 239, at 361–62 (“ Yet, amici curae—nonparties who are
nevertheless advocates, who are not bound by rules of standing and justiciability, or even rules of
evidence, and who can present the court with new information and arguments—occupy a unique
place in the appellate courts.”).
249. See Bethune Plaza, 863 F.2d at 531; Rio Grande Pipeline Co. v. FERC, 178 F.3d 533, 539
(D.C. Cir. 1999) (contrasting intervenors with amici).
250. Compare, e.g., King v. Governor of New Jersey, 767 F.3d 216, 244 –46 (3d Cir. 2014)
(holding that intervenors do not need to establish Article III standing); Perry v. Schwarzenegger,
630 F.3d 898, 906 (9th Cir. 2011); City of Herriman v. Bell, 590 F.3d 1176, 1183 –84 (10th Cir.
2010) (noting that an intervenor must still have a related claim or defense as the party with standing,
which this intervenor lacked); Dillard v. Chilton Cty. Comm’n, 495 F.3d 1324, 1336–37, 1336 n.10
(11th Cir. 2007) (requiring an intervenor to establish standing only “ when the original parties have
settled the claims between them, and the intervenor wishes to challenge the settlement”); United
States v. T ennessee, 260 F.3d 587, 595 (6th Cir. 2001); Ruiz v. Estelle, 161 F.3d 814, 829 –30 (5th
Cir. 1998) with City of Chicago v. Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, 660 F.3d 980, 984 –85 (7th Cir.
2011) (holding that intervenors must est ablish Article III standing); United States v. Metro. St.
Louis Sewer Dist., 569 F.3d 829, 833 (8th Cir. 2009); United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc.,
566 F.3d 1095, 1145–46 (D.C. Cir. 2009). See generally Rio Grande Pipeline Co. v. FERC, 178
F.3d 533, 537–41 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (describing cases that show conflicting decisions on whether an
intervenor must demonstrate Article III standing).
251. 137 S. Ct. 1645 (2017).
252. Id. at 1651.
253. Id.
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which the plaintiff requests.”254 In reaching this holding, the Court relied on the
rule that “[a]t least one plaintiff must have standing to seek each form of relief
requested in the complaint.”255
More directly related to PTAB appeals is the Federal Circuit appeal in
Knowles Electronics LLC v. Iancu. 256 In Knowles, the patent owner appealed
from an adverse inter partes reexamination decision. 257 The PTAB rejected
certain patent claims directed at the silicon condenser microphone “package.” 258
The party who had successfully requested the reexamination declined to
participate in the appeal. 259 The PTO sought to defend the PTAB’s decision as
an intervenor. After full briefing, during oral argument at the Federal Circuit,
Judge Newman raised the issue of the PTO’s ability to intervene in the case,
even though the appellant did not challenge the PTO’s right to participate.260
After the appeal was fully briefed and argued, the Federal Circuit issued the
following order sua sponte:
a. When the prevailing party in an inter partes reexamination
proceeding before the USPTO’s Patent Trial and Appeal Board
(“Board”) declines to appear before this court to defend the decision
below, is the USPTO’s Director required to possess Article III
standing in order to intervene?
b. If yes, does the Director possess such standing in this appeal?
c. Additionally, if the Director does in fact possess standing; must the
Director defend the Board’s decision? Alternatively, what are the
ramifications if the Director declines to defend the Board’s
decision?261
In the briefing, the PTO relied on Town of Chester and explained that, while
“a plaintiff—or person seeking relief from a federal court—must show ‘a
personal stake in the outcome[,]’ . . . [o]ther parties, such as defendants,
appellees, or intervenors who are not seeking affirmative relief, need not have
constitutional standing for a case to proceed.”262 The PTO also argued that, even

254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Knowles Elecs. LLC v. Iancu, 886 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (formerly Knowles Elecs.
LLC v. Matal).
257. Id. at 1371.
258. Id. at 1372.
259. Id. at n.1.
260. See Order at 2, Knowles Elecs. LLC v. Matal, No. 2016-1954 (Fed. Cir. June 30, 2017).
261. Id. T he third question is beyond the scope of the present article but raises an important
question about the PT O’s role as intervenor. See generally Dimtry Karshtedt, Acceptance Instead
of Denial: Pro-Applicant Positions at the PTO, 23 B.U. J. SCI. & T ECH . L. 319, 342–46 (2017).
262. Supplemental Brief for Intervenor at 4, Knowles Elecs. LLC v. Matal, No. 2016-1954
(Fed. Cir. July 31, 2017) (internal citations omitted).
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if Knowles is an intervenor, he had a personal stake in the outcome, thus
conferring standing. 263
In its supplemental briefing, the appellant did not substantially disagree with
the PTO’s position. 264 Thus, it seemed likely that the court will hold that the
PTO need not independently establish Article III standing if it is merely arguing
a position to support the PTAB’s decision. That would have been consistent
with the Supreme Court’s decision in Town of Chester and it would have
confirmed the PTO’s authority to defend the PTAB’s decisions on appeal,
regardless of whether the patent challenger continues through appeal.
Ultimately the court held, in a long footnote, that the USPTO Director had
standing to appeal, but did so in a way that left open whether an intervenor need
establish independent Article III standing. 265 Instead, the court relied heavily on
the statement from the Supreme Court in Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC v.
Lee that “the [USPTO] may intervene in a later Judicial proceeding to defend its
decision—even if the private challengers drop out”266 :
There is no dispute Knowles has standing since its patent has been
judged unpatentable and therefore it has presented ‘a justiciable case
or controversy.’ ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 618 (1989).
The Director of the USPTO has an unconditional statutory “right to
intervene in an appeal from a [PTAB] decision.” 35 U.S.C. § 143; see
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, §7(e), 125
Stat. 284, 315 (2011) (stating that the Director’s right to intervene
“shall be deemed to extend to inter partes reexaminations that are
requested under section 311 of such title before the effective date” of
the America Invents Act). Our precedent allows the USPTO to
intervene to defend a PTAB decision when a petitioner withdraws on
appeal, necessarily implying jurisdiction. See, e.g., NFC Tech., LLC
v. Matal, 871 F.3d 1367, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2017); In re NuVasive, Inc.,
842 F.3d 1376, 1379 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2016); In re Cuozzo Speed Techs.,
LLC, 793 F.3d 1268, 1272 (Fed. Cir. 2015), aff’d sub nom., Cuozzo
Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2143–44 (2016). We
follow the Supreme Court guidance in Cuozzo that “the [USPTO] may
intervene in a later Judicial proceeding to defend its decision—even if
the private challengers drop out.” 136 S. Ct. at 2144; cf. Pers. Audio,
LLC v. Elec. Frontier Found., 867 F.3d 1246, 1249 (Fed. Cir. 2017)
(reaffirming that “[w]ith Article III satisfied as to the appellant, [the
appellee] is not constitutionally excluded from appearing in court to

263. Id. at 5–6.
264. Supplemental Brief for Appellant at 8, Knowles Elecs. LLC v. Matal, No. 2016-1954
(Fed. Cir. Aug. 21, 2017).
265. Knowles Elecs. LLC v. Iancu, 886 F.3d 1369, 1372 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
266. Id. (quoting Cuozzo Speed T echs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2144 (2016)).
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defend the PTAB decision in its favor”). The Director of the USPTO,
thus, has standing. 267
Notably, the court referenced Personal Audio, LLC v. Electronic Frontier
Foundation, for the principle that an appellee need not establish independent
standing. 268 Here, the court noted, where the original petitioner has withdrawn,
the intervenor effectively steps into the shoes of the appellee. 269 Thus, the court
held the intervenor had standing where it had stepped into the shoes of the
appellee, in effect avoiding the issue of whether intervenors are even required to
demonstrate independent Article III standing. 270
VI. AMICUS ST ANDING
In contrast to appellants, appellees, and intervenors, an amicus curiae is not a
party to the litigation. 271 An amicus curiae, or a friend of the court, is any
individual or entity that desires to express its views about a case and how the
case may have broader implications beyond the immediate effects on the party
to the case. 272 As one commentator puts it, “amici curiae [are] nonparties who
are nevertheless advocates, who are not bound by rules of standing and
justiciability, or even rules of evidence, and who can present the court with new
information and arguments.”273
Therefore, an amicus does not need standing to file an amicus brief. 274 If a
potential intervenor is denied intervenor status, courts are likely to permit the
party to participate as an amicus. 275
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDAT IONS: PROCEDURAL , ST RAT EGIC
CONSIDERAT IONS REGARDING ST ANDING ON APPEAL
“Oh, sceptics and halfpenny philosophers, why do you halt half -way?”276
As noted, the unsettled nature of many aspects of appellate standing at the
Federal Circuit leaves open the chance for misapplication of precedent or

267. Id.
268. Id. (citing Pers. Audio, LLC v. Elec. Frontier Found., 867 F.3d 1246, 1249 (Fed. Cir.
2017)).
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. See, e.g., Rio Grande Pipeline Co. v. FERC, 178 F.3d 533, 539 (D.C. Cir. 1999)
(explaining that an entity that only sought to “ contribute its views to those issues raised by [a
party’s] petition for review” was an amicus curiae, not an intervenor).
272. Anderson, supra note 239, at 361.
273. Id.
274. See, e.g., Rio Grande Pipeline Co., 178 F.3d at 539.
275. See, e.g., Agric. Retailers Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 837 F.3d 60, 66 (D.C. Cir. 2016);
Silver v. Babbitt, 166 F.R.D. 418, 434–35 (D. Ariz. 1994), aff’d, 68 F.3d 480, 481 (9th Cir. 1995).
276. FYODOR DOSTOYEVSKY , CRIME AND P UNISHMENT 526 (Constance Garnett trans. 2000)
(“ But those men succeeded and so they were right, and I didn’t, and so I had no right to have taken
that step.” (emphasis added)).
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mistake. Our hope is this Article can assist as a clear-eyed survey of the limited
precedent here, and as a path forward for courts, practitioners, and others, free
of advocacy or intent to influence. To wit, the standing requirement on appeal
from the PTAB generates numerous procedural and strategic issues, many of
which remain unadressed. Some of these are dictated by the law of the Supreme
Court, other circuits, or the Federal Circuit—or at least by gaps in the law.
Others may result from the lack (to date) of procedural rules at the Federal
Circuit dictating how and when PTAB appeal standing issues are to be raised
and resolved. All merit further attention and study.
What is clear, however, is that the Federal Circuit’s recent cases suggest a
court struggling with the often-speculative but business-important reasons
behind administrative challenges. With the decisions in Altaire, the Court has
recognized the need for some leeway in allowing challenges to proceed prior to
financial harm occurring, but is wrestling with how much speculation and how
conditional that harm can be. As the court moves into this fraught area, it has
recognized, appropriately if tacitly, that only the party seeking to invoke the
Court’s jurisdiction need prove standing; and it has rejected the argument, now
before the Supreme Court, that the estoppel provisions alone provide the type of
harm justifying a petitioner’s appeal, though it has repeatedly noted that the
estoppel may enhance or add to the concreteness of the harm. And it has taken
small steps toward embracing a standing jurisprudence broader than that limited
solely to patent-centric DJ/infringement inquiries, in recognition of the standing
inquiry’s flexible nature.
A. Procedural
The first issue is defining the party’s burden in demonstrating standing on
appeal. The Supreme Court notes clearly that “[t]he party invoking federal
jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing these elements.”277 What has been
less clear is the amount and type of evidence necessary to meet that burden. The
courts have generally considered two possibilities: some courts have analogized
the inquiry as to the one undertaken when ruling on a motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim, 278 while others have analogized the inquiry to the one
undertaken when ruling on a motion for summary judgment. 279
The leading case among the circuits, and the most explicit about the timing of
meeting that burden, is the D.C. Circuit decision in Sierra Club v. Environmental
Protection Agency. 280 (In general, the D.C. Circuit is the leading authority on
appellate standing from administrative appeals.) There the court noted that “a
petitioner seeking review in the court of appeals does not ask the court merely

277. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992).
278. See Sierra Club v. EPA, 292 F.3d 895, 898–900 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (discussing standing
approaches in regards to varying procedural postures); see also FED . R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).
279. See Sierra Club, 292 F.3d at 898–900; see also FED . R. CIV. P. 56.
280. 292 F.3d 895 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
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to assess the sufficiency of its legal theory[,]” such as in a motion to dismiss, but
instead seeks “a final judgment on the merits, based upon the application of its
legal theory to facts established by evidence in the record[,]” such that a party
“must either identify in that record evidence sufficient to support its standing . .
. or . . . submit additional evidence to the court of appeals.”281 Despite the normal
judicial admonition against taking new evidence on appeal, given the unique
posture forced upon appellate courts by the administrative appeal standing
inquiry, the D.C. Circuit thought that this rule w as “the most fair and orderly
process by which to determine whether the petitioner has standing[,]” in part
because petitioners are often best situated to produce evidence of their
injuries. 282 However, the court counseled that the petitioner must identify
specific facts in the administrative record that support its standing argument or
present “affidavits or other evidence” attached to its opening brief, unless
standing is self-evident. 283
Another issue is when the parties should first raise the standing issue, as well
as when the court should resolve it. Many disputes about standing on appeal
have been raised in motions to dismiss for a lack of standing; others have been
raised in merits briefing. Still others have raised it in motions to dismiss, only
to have the issue shunted to the merits opinion, provoking a second round of
briefing on the issue. The approaches all have their own benefits and drawbacks.
An alternative—and complementary—approach is used by the D.C. Circuit.
In that court, when a party appeals for direct review of an agency decision, the
party is then required to provide a statement describing its basis for standing in
the docketing statement. 284 D.C. Circuit Rule 15(c)(2) reads: “In cases involving
direct review in this court of administrative actions, the docketing statement
must contain a brief statement of the basis for the appellant’s or petitioner’s
claim of standing. This statement may include reference to arguments, evidence,
or the administrative record supporting the claim of standing.”285 The rule was
inspired in part by, and in other ways meant to anticipate the need for, the ruling
in Sierra Club, which states:
[A] petitioner whose standing is not self-evident should establish its
standing by the submission of its arguments and any affidavits or other
evidence appurtenant thereto at the first appropriate point in the
review proceeding. In some cases that will be in response to a motion
to dismiss for want of standing; in cases in which no such motion has
been made, it will be with the petitioner’s opening brief—and not, as
in this case, in reply to the brief of the respondent agency. 286

281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.

Id.
Id. at 901.
Id. at 900.
D.C. Circuit Rule 15(c)(2).
Id. (citing Sierra Club, 292 F.3d at 900–01).
Sierra Club, 292 F.3d at 900 (emphasis added).
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The D.C. Circuit’s rule advantageously requires the appellant to identify its
basis for standing before briefing occurs, seemingly in recognition of the burden
of persuasion it bears on that issue. The information in the docketing statement
will likely not be the complete evidence supporting standing, but it does provide
the opposing party with an indication of whether there is a reasonable basis to
establish standing or whether it should be challenged by a motion to dismiss
before the briefing begins, and it provides a preview for the court itself that
standing may be at issue in this particular appeal.
Another question is whether evidence supporting standing can or should be
developed during the PTAB proceeding. 287 Overall, it seems unlikely that the
PTAB proceeding would be a proper vehicle to develop this evidence. The
PTAB proceeding has limited discovery and limited opportunities to submit
evidence concerning Article III standing. For example, for a petitioner to
establish Article III standing, the petitioner might have to provide evidence
showing that the existence of the challenged patent would cause financial harm
to the petitioner or that the petitioner is likely to be sued for patent
infringement. 288 However, those facts are rarely, if ever, relevant to any of the
patentability grounds or procedural requirements that form the basis of the patent
challenge. 289 And standing will not be disputed in many cases because the
petitioner has been sued or has been threatened with a suit for patent
infringement, so a rule requiring evidence or demanding further inquiry would
add unnecessary cost and complexity. Regardless, even in those cases where
standing is not immediately apparent, it seems unlikely that the PTAB
proceeding will afford the parties the ability to develop and challenge evidence
related to Article III standing.
The issue of when the requirement of standing attaches continues unanswered.
It is still unclear whether parties to an administrative proceeding below must
possess standing (1) at the time of the filing, (2) throughout the earlier-filed
proceeding, (3) at the time of the filing of the appeal, or (4) at the time the
briefing of the standing issue commences. 290 (There is a fifth option—one
related to ripeness and mootness—where courts may suggest their standing is
divested should some action occur post-briefing but prior to an issued panel
opinion. Such instances should be rare and heavily dependent on the facts of the
case. 291 ) Conceptually, the first and third options present logical solutions to

287. Indeed, during the Phigenix oral argument, Judge Dyk quest ioned why the appellant
should not be required to make the record to support standing while before the PT AB instead of
having to make the Federal Circuit conduct fact -finding on appeal for the first time. See Oral
Argument at 16:57–17:14, Phigenix, Inc. v. ImmunoGen, Inc., 845 F.3d 1168 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (No.
2016-1544), http://oralarguments.cafc.uscourts.gov/default.aspx?fl=2016 -1544.mp3.
288. See Burstein, supra note 14, at 513–14, 535.
289. Id. at 546–48 (explaining how it is usually a failure to meet the necessary subject matter
requirements—among other things—that invalidates a patent).
290. Id. at 504–09.
291. See, e.g., Show Cause Order, supra note 209.

2018]

Standing to Appeal at the Federal Circuit

695

this inquiry. Tracing the standing inquiry to the filing of the administrative
action analogizes the standing inquiry to a lower-court Article III trial, with the
appellate court acting as the receiving body. On the other hand, linking the
standing inquiry to the filing of the appeal is logical because the appellant seeks
to invoke the Article III standing of the appellate body alone.
In cases like American Library Association v. Federal Communications
Commission, 292 the court adopted a test similar to the former concept. 293 There,
the issue centered on whether a rule adopted in 2005—prior to the start of the
administrative action challenging it—harmed the American Library Association
such that standing existed on appeal. 294 That approach seems the norm, given
that so many of the inquires focus on facts found below to the extent the agency
record includes sufficient facts to show standing.
The general case law on standing seems clear on this point. Standing, and
jurisdiction in general, is determined at the time the operative complaint is
filed. 295 In the context of district court litigation, the Federal Circuit has
repeatedly looked at the facts that existed when the complaint was filed.296
Furthermore, events that occur subsequent to the filing of the complaint may not
be relied upon for showing jurisdiction at the time of the complaint. 297
Given this settled law, it is not surprising to see the Federal Circuit take the
“at the time of filing” approach. In PPG Industries, as discussed previously, the
court held that the appellant had established Article III standing in an appeal of
inter partes reexaminations from the PTAB. In doing so, the court stated:
The evidence shows that: (1) by the time PPG filed its notice of appeal
in this case, it had already launched a commercial can-interior coating
for the beverage can industry; and (2) PPG had received at least one
inquiry from a customer suggesting that Valspar intended to pursue
infringement litigation against PPG related to its can-interior
coating. 298

292. 401 F.3d 489 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
293. Id. at 492–93.
294. Id. at 490–91.
295. See Rockwell Int’l Corp. v. United States, 549 U.S. 457, 473–74 (2007) (“ [W]hen a
plaintiff files a complaint in federal court and then voluntarily amends the complaint, courts look
to the amended complaint to determine jurisdiction.”).
296. See GAF Bldg. Materials Corp. v. Elk Corp., 90 F.3d 479, 481–82 (Fed. Cir. 1996);
Spectronics Corp. v. H.B. Fuller Co., 940 F.2d 631, 633 –35 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
297. GAF Bldg. Materials Corp., 90 F.3d at 483 (stating that “ ‘[t]he presence or absence of
jurisdiction must be determined on the facts existing at the time the complaint under consideration
was filed’”) (quoting Arrowhead Indus. Water, Inc. v. Ecolochem, Inc., 846 F.2d 731, 734 n.2 (Fed.
Cir. 1988)); Spectronics Corp., 940 F.2d at 635 (stating that “later events may not create jurisdiction
where none existed at the time of filing”).
298. PPG Indus, Inc. v. Valspar Sourcing, Inc., 679 Fed. App’x 1002, 1004 (Fed. Cir. 2017)
(citation omitted).

696

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 67:605

The court expressly stated that the evidence to be considered was that which
existed “by the time PPG filed its notice of appeal.” 299
This analysis is
consistent with the Federal Circuit’s approach when assessing standing and
jurisdiction in district court cases. Contrast it with the Board’s ongoing inquiry
in Momenta Pharmaceuticals v. Bristol-Myers Squibb, where actions taken postoral argument have provoked a show cause order why the appeal should not be
dismissed as moot. 300 This at least suggests that some judges view the standing
(or at least, the justiciability) question as a live issue subject to change on
appeal—and possibly, one that can be cured or remedied, even after an appeal is
filed.
Another possible approach would require Article III standing, for purposes of
appeal, to exist at the time the AIA proceeding commences. Specifically, the
Federal Circuit could conceivably decide that the evidence necessary to establish
standing must exist at the time the IPR petition is filed or instituted, not merely
at the time notice of appeal is filed. There may be advantages to this approach,
but there does not appear to be any statutory or common law basis for such a
position. 301
The final consideration is how practitioners should treat such affidavits, either
as testimonial, evidentiary, or subject to deposition, objection, or any of the
procedural safeguards that attach fact-finding in most instances. As one
commentator notes, “The procedurally strange thing . . . was that the affidavits
were subject to none of the protections that normally would help ensure
accuracy. There was no discovery, no cross-examination, and, obviously, the
affiants’ credibility could not be fully weighed because they testified on paper,
not before the court.”302 That point is well-taken. There has been little
discussion of anything other than allowing both sides to submit unchallenged
affidavits into briefing—more akin to summary judgment than actual factfinding—although there is “no genuine issue of material fact.”303 It is worth
asking if such unchallenged “fact-finding” in the first instance can withstand due
process scrutiny, whereby one side can submit “evidence” unchallengeable in
that or any other forum. 304 It also means confidentiality and motions to seal
information for the first time on appeal become more likely, but also present
novel issues—as the appellate court is normally loathe to seal information or
opinions for the first time on appeal. In a situation where companies may
routinely consider filing business confidential information, it may make sense
for the clerks of court at the Federal Circuit to give greater leeway in sealing
additional evidence; it may also counsel toward submitting such evidence under

299.
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.

Id.
See Show Cause Order, supra note 209.
See Burstein, supra note 14, at 526–30, 526 n.179.
Wildermuth & Davies, supra note 16, at 979 (citation omitted).
Id. at 979–80.
Id. at 989–90.
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a protective order and seal in the case below, as the Court has in the past been
more solicitous to already-sealed information.
B. Strategic Issues
A party may also consider other factors when the issue of standing is or may
be implicated in an appeal from the PTAB. When multiple parties are involved,
on one or both sides of an appeal, the court may be disinclined to dismiss a
particular appellant, as long as at least one appellant clearly establishes
standing. 305 This is effectively the reasoning adopted in Personal Audio, which
relied on ASARCO306 and Department of Labor v. Triplett 307 for the idea that
only one party before the court needs to demonstrate standing for an appeal to
continue. 308 While it is unclear how the Federal Circuit will accept the idea that
only one party to the appeal is required to demonstrate standing, it does counsel
for any entities who may face hurdles in establishing standing to consider
strategic partnerships in filing petitions. One dramatic example of this approach
is Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 309 an appeal from a
Declaratory Judgment Act case below. 310 There, the plaintiff-appellees
included: The Association for Molecular Pathology, the American College of
Medical Genetics, and eighteen other associations and individuals. 311 On
appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision to proceed with
the case because “at least one plaintiff, Dr. Harry Ostrer, has standing to
challenge the validity of Myriad’s patents.”312
Another strategic issue considers the possible implications of claim preclusion
and issue preclusion based on a PTAB decision that cannot be appealed by the
petitioner. 313 If a party may not have standing on appeal, and the loss of a case
would lead to a damage claim or issue preclusion, formal or otherwise, that party
should weigh the benefits of invoking the PTAB’s jurisdiction, and the strength
of its case, with the possibility of loss and adverse consequences.
Parties with unique corporate structures, relationships, or business models
should take extra precautions at the time of filing any administrative challenge
to consider whether they may have standing to appeal, and should retain any
evidence relevant to a potential future challenge, especially if maintaining a
305. See U.S. Dep’t of Labor v. T riplett, 494 U.S. 715, 732 (1990); ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish,
490 U.S. 605, 623–25, 623 n.2 (1989).
306. See Pers. Audio, LLC v. Elec. Frontier Found., 867 F.3d 1246, 1250 (Fed. Cir. 2017)
(citing ASARCO Inc., 490 U.S. at 623–24, 623 n.2).
307. See id. (citing Triplett, 494 U.S. at 732 (Marshall, J., concurring)).
308. See id. at 1249–50.
309. 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011), rev’d on other grounds, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology
v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 596 (2013).
310. Id. at 1334.
311. Id. at 1329.
312. Id. at 1333–34.
313. Steinman, supra, note 16, at 898–900.
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possible appeal becomes important to them. This includes any issues arising
from corporate structure, customer/supplier relationships, nonprofit or public
interest missions, or third-party status.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In sum, the Federal Circuit has recently adopted, for the first time, the largely
settled law of appellant standing in the case of Phigenix. It has adopted the more
rational of two competing approaches to appellee standing in Personal Audio,
finding that Article III standing need only be satisfied by the party invoking the
court’s appellate jurisdiction. The Federal Circuit also held that the USPTO
Director can independently have standing to appeal as an intervenor but left
open whether an intervenor must establish independent Article III standing.
Thus, the Federal Circuit appears to be adopting the dominant view among the
circuits, in an area of the law that needs further research, study, and guidance.

